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This paper examines how di⁄erent establishments performed during the recent
global ￿nancial crisis, focusing on the role of foreign ownership. The paper in-
vestigates how foreign ownership a⁄ected establishments￿responses to negative
economic shocks, using a cross-country panel dataset with detailed information
on operation, location and industry for more than 12 million establishments from
2005-2008. The evidence shows that multinational subsidiaries on average fared
better than local counterfactuals with similar economic characteristics. Among
multinational subsidiaries, establishments with stronger production and ￿nancial
linkages with parent companies showed greater resilience. Finally, in contrast to
the crisis period, the impact of foreign ownership and linkages on an establish-
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11 Introduction
In 2007-2008, the world economy entered the deepest ￿nancial crisis since World War II.
Countries around the globe witnessed major declines in output, employment, and trade. GDP
in industrial countries fell by 4.5 percent while average GDP growth in emerging economies
dropped from 8.8 percent in 2007 to 0.4 percent. The unemployment rate rose to 9 percent
across OECD economies, and reached double digits in a mix of industrial and developing
nations. World trade plummeted by over 40 percent in the second half of 2008, collapsing at
a rate that outpaced the fall of total output.
The severity of what has been labeled as the Global Financial Crisis led many economists to
explore its macro patterns and causes. Rose and Spiegel (2010a, b), for example, investigate
the potential causes for the di⁄erential extent of the crisis across countries. Using a large
country-level dataset, they do not ￿nd international trade and ￿nancial linkages and other
major economic indicators to be clearly associated with incidences of the crisis. Eaton et
al. (2009), Levchenko, Lewis and Tesar (2010), and Chor and Manova (2011), among others,
examine the potential causes of the great trade collapse, a phenomenon that received particular
attention, and ￿nd, respectively, manufacturing demand, vertical specialization, and credit
conditions to play important roles.1
Less explored in this debate is the pattern of micro economic responses to the crisis.2 In
this paper, we examine the di⁄erential performance of establishments during the global crisis
with particular emphasis on the role of foreign ownership. We investigate how foreign own-
ership a⁄ected establishments￿resilience to the negative economic shocks using a worldwide
establishment panel dataset that reports detailed operation, location, and industry informa-
tion of over 12 million establishments in 2005-2008. We exploit how multinational corporation
(MNC) subsidiaries around the world responded to the crisis relative to local establishments
and the underlying mechanisms that led to the di⁄erential impact. This question is central
to ongoing policy debates over the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in economic growth
and volatility. For many countries, such as Ireland, Slovakia, Singapore, and Malaysia, which
have heavily relied on FDI as an engine of economic growth, there are increasing concerns
that FDI is more volatile than domestic investments and renders countries greater economic
vulnerabilities especially during economic crises.
Evaluating the role of foreign ownership during economic crises poses several challenges.
First, it is di¢ cult to disentangle the e⁄ect of foreign ownership from other establishment-
level characteristics such as size and productivity and macroeconomic factors such as market
1Baldwin and Evenett (2009) compile some of the leading explanations.
2One exception is Tong and Wei (2009), who examine whether the volume and composition of capital ￿ ows
a⁄ected the degree of credit crunches faced by a sample of emerging-economy manufacturing ￿rms in the
recent crisis. See Section 2 for an overview of this study and other papers, such as Alvarez and G￿rg (2007),
Desai, Foley and Forbes (2008), and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2011), that explore the role of foreign ownership in
establishment responses to past regional economic downturns and currency depreciations.
2demand and credit conditions. Second, why foreign ownership could lead to di⁄erential estab-
lishment performance often remains unclear. Di⁄erent aspects of foreign ownership can exert
sharply di⁄erent, and even opposing, impact on establishment performance. For example,
the ability of multinationals to shift production across countries can lead to more volatile
performance while market diversi￿cation can lend stronger stability. Assessing only the aver-
age e⁄ect of foreign ownership can fail to capture these di⁄erent mechanisms. Third, foreign
ownership can a⁄ect establishment performance in both crisis and non-crisis periods. It is im-
portant to separate the general e⁄ect of foreign ownership from its impact on establishments￿
responses to negative economic shocks.
To disentangle the e⁄ect of foreign ownership from the e⁄ects of other establishment and
macroeconomic factors, we adopt in our analysis a matching technique that creates a missing
counterfactual for each MNC subsidiary. The matching pairs each MNC subsidiary with
a local establishment that shares similar attributes and operates in the same country and
industry. Similarity is determined based on establishment-level economic characteristics that
have explanatory power in explaining establishments￿foreign ownership status. Matching on
the basis of characteristic similarity helps control for observable and unobservable di⁄erences
between MNC subsidiaries and local establishments. Drawing the match from the same
country and industry helps control for macroeconomic factors. The e⁄ect of foreign ownership
is hence inferred from the divergence in the performance paths between MNC subsidiaries and
their local matches.
To shed light on why foreign ownership could lead to divergent performance between
MNC subsidiaries and local competitors during the Global Financial Crisis, we explore two
distinct aspects of foreign ownership that have been highlighted in the theoretical literature
of multinational ￿rms.
The ￿rst aspect concerns the production linkages between MNC subsidiaries and par-
ent ￿rms. The existing theoretical literature on the determinants of MNC activities led by
Markusen (1984) and Helpman (1984) stresses two main types of MNC subsidiaries: hori-
zontal, which duplicate the production activities of parent ￿rms, and vertical, which share
an input-output linkage with parent ￿rms. While horizontal subsidiaries share a substituting
relationship with parent ￿rms, the production of vertical subsidiaries complements that of
parent ￿rms. In a time of crisis, when a host country experiences a decline in demand, the
two types of linkages can lead to sharply di⁄erent impact. For horizontal MNC subsidiaries,
the ability of MNCs to shift production back home will likely result in more volatile perfor-
mance. For vertical subsidiaries, the intra-￿rm demand from parent ￿rms will help absorb
the negative demand shock in the host country, leading to more resilient responses to the
crisis.3 This stabilizing role of vertical production linkages should be particularly pronounced
3By examining the e⁄ect of vertical production linkages on establishment performance, our work adds to
the debate on the link between vertical integration and the great trade collapse. Bems, Johnson and Yi (2010),
3in host countries with large negative demand shocks. We construct a direct measure of pro-
duction linkages by examining the input-output relationship between the primary products of
the subsidiaries and parent ￿rms, i.e., the input-cost share of the subsidiary￿ s primary prod-
uct category in the parent ￿rm￿ s ￿nal-good production. Subsidiaries sharing stronger vertical
production linkages with the parents are expected to exhibit more resilience during the crisis.4
The second aspect of foreign ownership concerns the ￿nancial linkages between MNC sub-
sidiaries and parent ￿rms. An emerging strand of theoretical studies such as Antras, Desai
and Foley (2009) highlights MNCs￿internal capital markets and investment ￿ ows from parents
to subsidiaries. In this analysis, we consider how MNCs￿internal capital markets lower sub-
sidiaries￿dependence on host-country credit conditions, an advantage particularly important
when host countries experience credit crunches. To examine this hypothesis, we construct a
measure of ￿nancial linkages between parents and subsidiaries in each industry using the ratio
of investments in subsidiaries relative to total assets. We also consider an alternative approach
by constructing a measure of sectoral ￿nancial dependence and investigating how the e⁄ect
of foreign ownership varies with the reliance on ￿nancial capital. According to our hypoth-
esis, the e⁄ect of foreign ownership on establishment responses to credit crunches should be
more pronounced in industries with stronger intra-￿rm ￿nancial linkages and greater ￿nancial
dependence.
To establish the impact of foreign ownership and linkages on establishment responses to
negative economic shocks, we explore the time variation of the data and separately consider
the non-crisis (2005-2007) and the crisis (2007-2008) periods. This enables us to use the non-
crisis period as a benchmark and compare the e⁄ect of foreign ownership during the crisis with
its e⁄ect in non-crisis years. The comparison helps us identify the e⁄ects of foreign ownership
that are exclusive to crises periods and the unique role of production and ￿nancial linkages
in lending MNC subsidiaries greater resilience to negative demand and ￿nancial shocks.
Our paper o⁄ers new ￿ndings on the role of foreign ownership in establishments￿resilience
to economic crises. We ￿nd that MNC subsidiaries responded on average better to the Global
Financial Crisis than local controls with similar economic characteristics. Moreover, the ad-
vantage of foreign ownership was clearly pronounced during the crisis, but relatively muted
during non-crisis years. Compared to local controls, MNC subsidiaries exhibited greater re-
silience to the crisis but not signi￿cantly better performance during normal economic periods.
By investigating why foreign ownership led to divergent performance during the crisis, our
analysis also provides one of the ￿rst micro evidence on the role of production and ￿nancial
investigating the role of global supply chains, argue that increasing vertical specialization contributes to the
greater contraction of world trade relative to total output. Bricongne, FontagnŁ, et al. (2009) present an
alternative argument and show that the extensive presence of supply chains does not automatically explain
why world trade overshot the drop in world GDP.
4Albeit previously unidenti￿ed, this hypothesis is not entirely unexpected. Bernard et al. (2009) have
shown that intra-￿rm trade fell less than unrelated-party trade during the Asian ￿nancial crisis.
4linkages in establishment responses to economic crises. We show that establishments sharing
stronger vertical production linkages with foreign parent ￿rms exhibited more resilient per-
formance during the crisis, especially in host countries with greater negative demand shocks.
Horizontally linked establishments, in contrast, performed no better than the control estab-
lishments. Further, the role of vertical production linkages is found signi￿cant only during the
crisis period. In the non-crisis period, vertical MNC subsidiaries did not perform di⁄erently
than local matches while horizontal subsidiaries fared slightly better.
In examining the ￿nancial linkage hypothesis, we ￿nd MNC subsidiaries to exhibit a
greater advantage over local counterfactuals in industries with stronger ￿nancial linkages
between parents and subsidiaries. The e⁄ect of ￿nancial linkages is especially strong when
host-country credit conditions worsened signi￿cantly and weak when home-country credit
conditions declined. Similar to production linkages, ￿nancial linkages are not found to exert a
signi￿cant e⁄ect on establishment performance in the non-crisis period. These results suggest
that the linkages between foreign subsidiaries and parent ￿rms play an important role in
establishments￿resilience to economic crises, but not necessarily in their growth in normal
economic time.
Finally, we show that the estimated e⁄ect of foreign ownership and linkages is robust to
alternative empirical speci￿cations that address issues such as the e⁄ect of domestic linkages
and unobserved ￿rm heterogeneity. When examining whether the production and ￿nancial
linkages of domestically owned subsidiaries exerted a similar e⁄ect during the crisis, we ￿nd
that compared to domestically owned subsidiaries, foreign owned subsidiaries exhibited a
greater advantage over local counterfactuals in the crisis. Moreover, while ￿nancial linkages
with domestic parents also played a stabilizing role, the e⁄ect of foreign ￿nancial linkages was
signi￿cantly greater and only foreign production linkages had a signi￿cant and positive e⁄ect
on establishments￿resilience to the crisis. The results are also robust when we control for
unobserved MNC heterogeneity and limit the comparison to subsidiaries owned by the same
parent ￿rm. We ￿nd subsidiaries with stronger vertical production linkages to the parents to
signi￿cantly outperform their peers in the same MNC.
Our ￿ndings o⁄er important policy implications on the role of FDI during economic crises.
Our analysis suggests that FDI exerts an important and positive e⁄ect on economic responses
to the crises. This e⁄ect results from the linkages created between MNC subsidiaries and
parent ￿rms. Vertical production and ￿nancial linkages could signi￿cantly lessen the impact
of the crisis in host countries.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. We review the existing literature in Section
2. In Section 3, we describe the dataset and the primary variables used in the analysis. The
econometric methodology and main empirical evidence are presented in Sections 4 and 5,
respectively, and the additional empirical analysis in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
52 Related Literature
Our paper is closely related to the existing macro and micro literature that evaluates the
e⁄ects of foreign investments on economic growth and performance. At the macro level, the
literature has primarily focused on the role of FDI in country economic growth, and found
only weak support for an exogenous positive e⁄ect of FDI. Existing evidence shows the e⁄ect
of FDI to be strongly conditional on local conditions such as human capital and ￿nancial
sector development (see, for example, Borensztein et al., 1998; Alfaro et al., 2004; Carkovic
and Levine, 2005).
The micro-level literature, evaluating the role of foreign ownership in economic perfor-
mance at establishment level, has found mainly an adverse e⁄ect. Most studies ￿nd foreign
ownership to have a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect on plant survival and stability, and argue
that MNCs￿footloose nature makes them more volatile than purely domestic ￿rms. G￿rg
and Strobl (2003), for example, ￿nd Irish establishments with foreign ownership to be more
likely than indigenous plants to exit the market after controlling for other plant and industry
speci￿c characteristics. Gibson and Harris (1996) and Bernard and Sj￿holm (2003) reach
similar conclusions for New Zealand and Indonesia, respectively. Bernard and Jensen (2007)
focus on domestic multinationals in the United State and ￿nd them to be more likely than
non-multinational ￿rms to shut down home-country plants.5
Relatively few analyses have examined the role of foreign ownership in establishment
responses to economic crises. Alvarez and G￿rg (2007), investigating the response of multi-
national and domestic ￿rms to an economic downturn in Chile, do not ￿nd multinationals to
react to the economic crisis di⁄erently than domestic ￿rms. Desai, Foley and Forbes (2008),
evaluating the response of multinational and local ￿rms to sharp currency depreciations, ￿nd
sales, assets, and investments to increase signi￿cantly more for U.S. multinational a¢ liates
than for local ￿rms. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2011) utilize a ￿rm-level database from six Latin
American countries between 1990 to 2005 to compare investment undertaken by domestic ex-
porters to that of foreign-owned exporters in the aftermath of currency crises. They ￿nd that,
conditional on ￿rm exposure to short term foreign currency debt, foreign-owned exporters in-
crease investment signi￿cantly more than domestic exporters.
Di⁄erent from the above studies￿ focus on regional economic slowdowns and currency
depreciations, our analysis draws from the recent Global Financial Crisis. We look to the
global coverage and the considerable heterogeneity of the recent crisis to examine the di⁄erent
roles of foreign ownership in establishments￿ reactions to economic shocks. Furthermore,
in contrast to previous studies￿focus on evaluating the average e⁄ect of foreign ownership,
we seek to explore the channels through which foreign ownership can a⁄ect establishment
5Another notable literature on the host-country e⁄ects of FDI focuses on the productivity spillovers of
multinational ￿rms. See, for example, Haddad and Harrison (1993), Aitken and Harrison (1999), Blomstr￿m
and Sj￿holm (1999), and Javorcik (2004) for studies in this area.
6performance during economic crises. In doing so, our analysis helps to disentangle some of
the ambiguities in previous ￿ndings.
Also exploring the recent crisis, Tong and Wei (2009) examine whether the volume and
composition of capital ￿ ows a⁄ected the degree of credit crunch faced by manufacturing ￿rms.
Using data on 3,823 ￿rms in 24 emerging countries, the authors ￿nd declines in stock prices
to be, on average, more severe for ￿rms intrinsically more dependent on external ￿nance. The
volume of capital ￿ ows had no signi￿cant e⁄ect on the severity of the credit crunch, but the
composition of capital ￿ ows mattered: pre-crisis exposure to non-FDI capital in￿ ows worsened
the credit crunch whereas exposure to FDI alleviated liquidity constraints.
In this paper, we investigate both whether and why FDI could lead to better establishment
performance during the crisis. We explore the role of production, as well as ￿nancial, linkages
between MNC subsidiaries and parent ￿rms, and evaluate how the relationships led to di⁄er-
ential establishment responses to the negative demand and ￿nancial shocks. We also compare
the results during the crisis with non-crisis years to examine whether foreign ownership exerts
a di⁄erent e⁄ect during economic crises.
3 Data Description
3.1 The Global Financial Crisis and Establishment Performance
The recent Global Financial Crisis, regarded as the worst ￿nancial crisis since the Great De-
pression of the 1930s, is notable for its speed, severity, and international span. The crisis was
triggered by a liquidity shortfall in the U.S. banking system, starting with the collapse of the
U.S. subprime industry in 2007 (including the bankruptcy of some of the largest mortgage
lenders such as New Century Financial and American Home Mortgage Investment Corpora-
tion), and quickly resulted in failures of large ￿nancial institutions (such as the ￿re sale of
Bear Stearns in March 2008 and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008).6
The crisis was soon spread to non-￿nancial sectors and economies around the world. Almost
all industrial countries and a large number of developing and emerging economies were in-
￿ icted in 2008, witnessing substantial declines in total output and employment. Between 2007
and 2008, world GDP fell by 5 percent, unemployment rates rose to 9 percent in industrial
nations, and read world exports plunged by 17 percent.
The dramatic shift of the world economy in 2007-2008 constitutes an ideal context for
examining micro economic responses to large negative economic shocks. Our analysis draws
from this unique episode and exploits its broad coverage as well as considerable heterogeneity,
both of which help disentangle the role of foreign ownership in establishment performance
6The National Bureau of Economic Research o¢ cially determined December 2007 as the end of the economic
expansion that began in the U.S. in November 2001 and the beginning of the recession.
7from other economic factors.
We employ a new worldwide establishment dataset, WorldBase, that reports the perfor-
mance of over 12 million establishments in 2005-2008. This dataset provides several distinct
advantages over alternative data sources. First, unlike many other sources that lag con-
siderably in assembling data, WorldBase reports updated 2008 operational information for
establishments around the world.7 Although the data coverage still does not re￿ ect world
population, it enables us to provide one of the ￿rst systematic micro-level analysis on the
recent crisis.
Second, the dataset, covering establishment activities both before and during the Global
Financial Crisis, enables us to compare the role of foreign ownership during the crisis with the
non-crisis years. Using the non-crisis period as a counterfactual helps us identify the e⁄ect of
foreign ownership, including production and ￿nancial linkages, on establishment responses to
adverse economic shocks.
Third, central to our analysis, the unit of observation in WorldBase is establishment (a
single physical location at which production operations or services are performed) instead of
￿rm. Establishments have their own addresses, business names, and managers, but might be
partly or wholly owned by other ￿rms. The database supports the linking of establishments
to ￿rms using information on domestic and global parents and the DUNS identi￿cation.8
Fourth, the dataset covers a larger number of countries than alternative data sources,
enabling a comprehensive analysis of the crisis for both developed and developing nations
and for countries at the epicenter as well as on the periphery of the crisis. It also allows
us to investigate how the role of foreign ownership varies across countries depending on the
incidences of the crisis.
WorldBase is compiled by Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) and covers public and private enter-
prises in over 100 countries and territories. Dun & Bradstreet has been the leading source
of commercial credit and marketing information since 1845, and presently operates in more
than a dozen countries and territories either directly or through a¢ liates, agents, and asso-
ciated business partners. D&B compiles data from a wide range of sources including public
registries, partner ￿rms, telephone directory records, and websites, and veri￿es all informa-
tion centrally via a variety of manual and automated checks. Early uses of the D&B data
include Caves￿(1975) size and diversi￿cation pattern comparisons between Canadian and U.S.
domestic plants and subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals in Canada, and Lipsey￿ s (1978) com-
parisons of the D&B data with existing sources with regard to the reliability of U.S. data.
7For example, the latest UNIDO INDSTAT 2009 Database, an authority industry-level data source, reports
industrial data only up to 2007. The OECD STAN Database, another widely used industry-level dataset,
currently provides 2008 data for only 13 OECD countries.
8To identify businesses numerically for data-processing purposes, D&B introduced in 1963 the Data Uni-
versal Numbering System (the D-U-N-S Number). The system supports the linking of plants and ￿rms across
countries and tracking of plant histories including name changes.
8Recent research that has used the D&B data includes Harrison, Love, and McMillian￿ s (2004)
analysis of capital ￿ ows, Black and Strahan￿ s (2002) study of entrepreneurial activity in the
United States, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton￿ s (2009) cross-country study of concentration
and vertical integration, and Alfaro and Charlton￿ s (2009) analysis of vertical and horizontal
activities of multinationals.
We impose a number of requirements in cleaning the data. First, we drop records that lack
primary industry classi￿cation and starting year information. Second, we restrict the data to
establishments that report sales information for all years. Moreover, we include only estab-
lishments with positive sales and employment in 2005. Requiring positive employment helps
to exclude establishments registered exclusively for tax purposes as well as self-employment
businesses. These types of establishments constitute a signi￿cant share of businesses in coun-
tries such as the United States. Finally, we drop agricultural and mining industries as well
as countries with fewer than 100 observations. These criteria result in a ￿nal sample of
approximately 12 million establishments in 53 countries.
We use four categories of information for each establishment: (i) industry information
including the 4-digit SIC code of the primary industry in which each establishment oper-
ates and, for most countries, the SIC codes of as many as ￿ve secondary industries, listed
in descending order of importance; (ii) ownership information including the establishments￿
domestic and global parents, status (joint-venture, corporation, partnership), and position
in the hierarchy (branch, division, headquarters); (iii) location information; (iv) operational
information including sales, employment, and export status.
Establishment performance is measured in this paper by the annual percentage change of
sales. An establishment is considered foreign owned if its parent ￿rm is based in a di⁄erent
country. There are 43,513 foreign owned subsidiaries in the ￿nal sample.
3.2 Production Linkages
To measure the production linkages between subsidiaries and foreign parent ￿rms, we examine
the input-output relationship between each subsidiary￿ s primary product category and the
parent ￿rm￿ s ￿nal goods.
First, we follow Acemoglu et al. (2009) and Alfaro and Charlton (2009) in considering
two main types of MNC subsidiaries: horizontal and vertical. Horizontal subsidiaries refer to
subsidiaries that duplicate parent ￿rms￿￿nal-good production. We identify these subsidiaries
by comparing their primary product category with the ￿nal product categories of their parent
￿rms, all reported at SIC 4-digit level. If the subsidiary￿ s primary product category is listed
as one of the parent ￿rm￿ s ￿nal products, the subsidiary is considered as horizontal.9 The
9We also separately considered subsidiaries that produce parent ￿rms￿core ￿nal product and those that
produce secondary ￿nal products and did not ￿nd the two types of horizontal subsidiaries to have di⁄erent
performance.
9manufacturing industries in which we observe the largest number of horizontal subsidiaries
include, for example, motor vehicle parts and accessories, plastics products n.e.c., electronic
components n.e.c., pharmaceutical preparations, and chemicals and chemical preparations.
Vertical subsidiaries refer to subsidiaries that share a vertical production linkage with
parent ￿rms. Speci￿cally, a subsidiary is considered vertical if the direct requirement of the
subsidiary￿ s primary product category in the parent ￿rm￿ s ￿nal-good production, measured
by the input cost share, exceeds a threshold value 0.1.10
Note that there are also subsidiaries that are neither horizontal nor vertically linked to their
parent ￿rms.11 The production activities of these subsidiaries can be viewed as independent
of the production activities of their parents, and are as a result not expected to bene￿t from
vertical production linkages like vertical subsidiaries during economic crises.
Alternative to dividing subsidiaries to di⁄erent groups, we also directly take into account
the strength of the production linkages, i.e., the input-cost share of the subsidiary￿ s primary
product category in the parent ￿rm￿ s ￿nal-good production. Subsidiaries whose primary
products account for a greater share of the parent ￿rms￿total input costs are considered to
exhibit a stronger vertical production linkage with the parent ￿rms.
As in Acemoglu et al. (2009) and Alfaro and Charlton (2009), the input-output rela-
tionships between product categories are taken from the U.S. 2002 Benchmark Input-Output
Accounts published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Constructing the production linkage
measure using the U.S. input-output accounts data is motivated by three considerations. First,
compared to ￿rm-level input-output information which is typically unavailable, industry-level
input-output relationships re￿ ect standardized production technologies and are relatively sta-
ble over time, limiting the potential for the production linkage measure to endogenously
respond to idiosyncratic shocks. Second, using the U.S. as the reference country further
mitigates the possibility of endogenous production linkage measures. Third, the U.S. input-
output accounts are more disaggregated than most other countries, enabling us to dissect
vertical production linkages between detailed product categories.
The manufacturing industry pairs with the strongest vertical production linkages include,
for example, (i) motor vehicles and passenger car bodies, and motor vehicle parts and acces-
sories, (ii) plastics materials, synthetic resins, and nonvulcanizable elastomers, and plastics
products, (iii) air-conditioning and warm air heating equipment and commercial and industrial
refrigeration equipment, and motor vehicles and passenger car bodies.
3.3 Financial Linkages
The ￿nancial linkages between parent ￿rms and subsidiaries are also typically not observed for
most ￿rms. We thus construct a variable to represent the degree of intra-￿rm ￿nancial linkages
10We also considered di⁄erent threshold values and found the results relatively similar.
11This type of subsidiaries accounts for 6 percent of foreign owned subsidiaries.
10in each industry. We assume that because of heterogeneity in intrinsic industry characteristics
such as headquarter intensity and capital intensity, industries incur di⁄erent bene￿ts and costs
from ￿nancial integration and thus have di⁄erent incentives to invest in subsidiaries. This
assumption is consistent with the ￿ndings of a growing literature led by Antras (2003) and
Antras and Helpman (2004), who show that industries with higher headquarter intensity
and capital intensity tend to have greater incentives to engage in integration and subsidiary
investment.
To measure the degree of intra-￿rm ￿nancial linkages in each industry, we use the ratio
of investments in subsidiaries relative to total assets for the median ￿rm of each industry.
This ratio captures the extent of ￿nancial integration by the industry of parent ￿rms. Given
that the information required to compute the variable is not systematically available for
private ￿rms around the world, the variable is computed based on a dataset of publicly listed
companies obtained from the Global COMPUSTAT. The measure is averaged for 2000-2004
to smooth out temporary ￿ uctuations.
While identi￿cation of our analysis does not require industries to have exactly the same
￿nancial linkage levels over time and across countries, it does rely on the ranking of industries
to be relatively stable. Otherwise, the proxy could potentially bias us against ￿nding any
relationship between ￿nancial linkages and establishment responses to economic crises. For
this reason, we perform two checks on the variable. First, we construct the measure using data
from di⁄erent time periods and ￿nd the ranking of industries to be relatively stable over time.
This observation suggests that industries￿ranking in the degree of intra-￿rm ￿nancial linkages
is mainly dependent on characteristics innate to each industry and thus unlikely to change
structurally in response to short-term idiosyncratic shocks. Second, we compute the variable
for each major MNC parent country and ￿nd high rank correlations across countries. For our
empirical analysis, we do not use country-speci￿c measures to mitigate potential endogeneity
even though in doing so our estimates could be potentially biased downward.
According to our measure, industries that exhibit the strongest ￿nancial linkages between
parents and subsidiaries include cut stone and stone products, newspapers: publishing or
publishing and printing, fats and oils, ordance and accessories except vehicles and guided
missiles, grain mill products, broadwoven fabric mills, manmade ￿ber and silk, paperboard
mills, and petroleum re￿ning.12
We also consider an alternative approach to examine the ￿nancial linkage hypothesis. We
follow Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Braun and Larrain (2005) in constructing a measure
12As a robustness check, we also computed the ￿nancial linkage variable using the average share of a¢ liate
assets ￿nanced by parent ￿rms in each industry based on the U.S. BEA Direct Investment Abroad Benchmark
Data. The results were largely similar. This measure has been considered in Antras, Foley and Desai (2009).
Their analysis shows that host-country characteristics can exert a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the level of ￿nancial
linkages within MNCs. But to the extent that the e⁄ect of country characteristics applies symmetrically across
industries as shown in their paper, the ranking of industries is likely to be relatively similar across countries.
11of ￿nancial dependence for each industry. The expectation is that if ￿nancial linkages play
a signi￿cant role in helping establishments attain greater resilience to credit crunch, the role
should be particularly pronounced in industries with greater ￿nancial dependence.
The ￿nancial dependence variable is measured using the share of capital expenditure not
￿nanced with cash ￿ ows from operations for the median ￿rm in each industry, and captures
establishments￿dependence on other sources of capital supply such as external loans and intra-
￿rm ￿nancing. Similar to the ￿nancial linkage variable, the ￿nancial dependence measure is
computed using the 2000-2004 publicly listed company data from Global COMPUSTAT, with
the ranking of industries found relatively stable over time and highly correlated across major
countries. Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Braun and Larrain (2005) argue that the measure of
￿nancial dependence captures a large technological component that is innate to a sector and
is therefore a good proxy for ranking industries in all countries. Industries with the greatest
￿nancial dependence according to this classi￿cation include, for example, electric machinery,
textiles, transport equipment, plastic products, and primary metal.
3.4 Other Economic Characteristics
A variety of other establishment-level economic characteristics including sales, labor produc-
tivity, age, multi-product status, and exporter status, all lagged by two years, are also taken
into account. We use lagged sales to control for establishment size, and labor productivity
to proxy for e¢ ciency. We also considered alternative measures such as employment size and
market share and found similar results. In addition, we take into account each establishment￿ s
age and multi-product status. The latter variable is an indicator variable that identi￿es es-
tablishments producing more than one product, and helps control for the e⁄ect of product
diversi￿cation. Finally, we use an indicator variable to separate exporting establishments from
establishments that sell only domestically. This variable helps capture the role of previous
export participation.
4 Econometric Strategy
The primary goal of our empirical analysis is to evaluate, ￿rst, the net e⁄ect of foreign
ownership on establishment performance during the crisis and, second, conditional on foreign
ownership how production and ￿nancial linkages led to the di⁄erential responses of MNC
subsidiaries.
An empirical issue that can arise when evaluating the net e⁄ect of foreign ownership is the
potential endogeneity of foreign ownership status. For example, one can argue that foreign
MNCs may have performed better during the crisis because they acquired more productive
local establishments or due to unobserved characteristics. If this were the case, the estimated
12e⁄ect of foreign ownership could su⁄er from selection bias.13
To mitigate the potential endogeneity of foreign ownership status, we employ a matching
technique that creates the missing counterfactual of each foreign owned subsidiary￿ s perfor-
mance had the establishment not been owned by foreign MNCs. This is done by matching
each foreign owned subsidiary with a local establishment based on economic characteristics,
such as lagged sales, labor productivity, age and previous exporter status. Each matched
pair thus shared similar economic attributes prior to the evaluation period, except the sta-
tus of foreign ownership. We then evaluate the e⁄ect of foreign ownership by comparing the
performance of matched establishments.
Formally, the e⁄ect of foreign ownership in a given period can be expressed as follows:
￿ ￿ E (Y1jforeign ownership = 1) ￿ E (Y0jforeign ownership = 1); (1)
where ￿ denotes the estimated e⁄ect of foreign ownership, Y represents the outcome of
interest, i.e., annual percentage change of sales, the subscript of Y describes the (poten-
tially hypothetical) circumstances under which the outcome is evaluated with 1 denoting the
case with foreign ownership and 0 denoting the case without foreign ownership, and foreign
ownership = 1 refers to the group of establishments owned by foreign MNCs (i.e., the treat-
ment group). The above equation represents the di⁄erence in performance between a foreign
owned subsidiary (the ￿rst right-hand-side term) and the same establishment had it not been
foreign owned (the second term). The latter, however, is an unobserved counterfactual.
The matching method is a strategy of constructing the unobserved counterfactual by iden-
tifying a match with similar economic characteristics for each foreign owned subsidiary. The
underlying assumption is that the matched pairs, conditioning on the observed characteristics
X, would perform similarly under the same circumstances. Hence, the above equation can be
rewritten as:
￿ = E (Y1jforeign ownership = 1;X) ￿ E (Y0jforeign ownership = 0;X) (2)
￿ [E (Y0jforeign ownership = 1;X) ￿ E (Y0jforeign ownership = 0;X)]:
The ￿rst di⁄erence on the right hand side of the above equation represents the observed di⁄er-
ence in performance between foreign owned and local establishments. The second di⁄erence
represents the selection bias, that is, the di⁄erence in performance between foreign owned
13The estimated e⁄ect of production and ￿nancial linkages conditional on foreign ownership is less likely
to be subject to the above concern because the identi￿cation there is primarily drawn from variations across
foreign owned subsidiaries and how they relate to cross-industry variations in the degree of production and
￿nancial linkages. As described in Sections 3.2-3.3, both linkage measures re￿ ect characteristics intrinsic to
each industry and are thus unlikely to depend on unobserved establishment or country factors. As a robustness
check, we also did not ￿nd a systematic relationship between pre-crisis establishment and parent characteristics,
such as size, labor productivity and age, and the observed linkages.
13subsidiaries, under the hypothetical circumstances that they had not been foreign owned, and
local establishments. Our goal is to minimize the selection bias through the matching process
and estimate the e⁄ect of foreign ownership. Given the large dimension of observable char-
acteristics, we employ propensity score matching.14 We perform the procedure for non-crisis
and crisis periods separately to examine whether the e⁄ect of foreign ownership varies during
the crisis.
We proceed in two stages. In the ￿rst stage, we estimate a probit model of establish-
ment foreign ownership status, with lagged observable establishment characteristics (includ-
ing size, labor productivity, age, multi-product status, and exporter indicator) as explanatory
variables. To increase the precision of the matching, the estimation (and the subsequent
matching) is performed for each country and sector. Consistent with the literature, we ￿nd a
signi￿cant and positive relationship between foreign ownership status and establishment size
and labor productivity for most countries and sectors.15 The predicted probability of being
foreign owned (or the propensity score), denoted by P(X) = Pr(foreign ownership = 1jX),
forms the basis of the matching procedure.
In the second stage, we adopt one-to-one nearest neighbor matching and identify a local
establishment l for each foreign owned subsidiary i such that
l(i) = argmin
jjforeign ownershipj=0
jPj(X) ￿ Pi(X)j; (3)
that is, the di⁄erence in the predicted probability of being foreign owned in minimized. We
impose an additional requirement that the match must come from the same country and
sector.16 To assess how well the propensity score matching performs in our analysis, we un-
dertake tests of the balancing property and ￿nd no statistically signi￿cant di⁄erences between
the treated and the control group in terms of lagged economic characteristics (size, labor pro-
ductivity, age, multi-product status, and exporter indicator). Moreover, our matched pairs of
establishments are, on average, 0.02 percentage point apart in terms of the propensity score.
These observations give us con￿dence that our matching procedure has grouped together
relatively homogeneous establishments.
The average treatment e⁄ect of foreign ownership can then be inferred from the average
14This technique is proposed in the seminal work of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and has become increas-
ingly popular in recent empirical research along with other matching estimators developed to estimate average
treatment e⁄ects.
15Given the ￿rst-stage estimation is performed for each country and sector, the estimation results are sup-
pressed in the paper because of space consideration and available upon request.
16In the matching procedure, we exclude observations outside the common support. The common support is
bound by the lowest propensity score of a treatment observation and the highest propensity score of a control
observation.
14performance di⁄erence of matched pairs, that is,





To examine how production and ￿nancial linkages led to the di⁄erential performance of
foreign owned subsidiaries, we employ the following baseline empirical speci￿cation:
Yi ￿ Yl(i) = ￿ + ￿1Prod Linkagesi + ￿2Financial Linkagesi + "i (5)
where Yi￿Yl(i) denotes the performance di⁄erence between foreign owned subsidiary i and its
local match l, Prod Linkagesi and Financial Linkagesi represent, respectively, the extent
of sectoral production and ￿nancial linkages between subsidiary i and its parent ￿rms, ￿1 and
￿2 represent, respectively, the e⁄ect of production and ￿nancial linkages on foreign owned
subsidiaries￿performance relative to local matches￿ , and "i denotes the residuals. Given that
the dependent variable is constructed from the matching analysis, the standard errors are
bootstrapped with industry clustering.17
5 Main Empirical Evidence
In this section, we ￿rst present the estimated average e⁄ect of foreign ownership in crisis and
non-crisis periods, and then examine the role of production and ￿nancial linkages in explaining
the e⁄ect of foreign ownership.
5.1 The Average E⁄ect of Foreign Ownership





sis and non-crisis years, respectively. The results indicate that foreign owned subsidiaries
exhibited on average higher sales growth rates than their local matches in 2007-2008. The
performance di⁄erence between the matched pairs of establishments is both statistically and
economically signi￿cant, and estimated around 3 percentage points. In contrast to the crisis
period, the average treatment e⁄ect of foreign ownership is signi￿cantly moderate in non-crisis
years. Foreign owned subsidiaries displayed merely 0.2 percentage point higher sales growth
rates than local matches in 2005-2007. The di⁄erence between crisis and non-crisis years in
the estimated treatment e⁄ect of foreign ownership is statistically signi￿cant as indicated by
the last column of Table 1.
[Table 1 about here]
17See Pagan (1984) for a seminal analysis on regressions with generated regressors. The standard errors are
clustered at the industry level because the key explanatory variables are measured at the industry level.
15These results suggest that foreign ownership exerted a positive e⁄ect on establishments￿
resilience to the Global Financial Crisis, but a very limited e⁄ect on establishment performance
in non-crisis years. In the following sub-sections, we investigate the di⁄erent mechanisms
that can lead to performance di⁄erence between foreign owned and domestic establishments,
especially during economic crises.
5.2 The Role of Production Linkages
First, we evaluate the role of production linkages. Table 2 breaks down the estimated e⁄ect
of foreign ownership by the type of production linkages, including horizontal subsidiaries,
vertical subsidiaries and neither category. The estimates suggest that foreign MNC sub-
sidiaries with vertical production linkages to parent ￿rms signi￿cantly outperformed their
local matches during the crisis, exhibiting 23 percentage points higher growth rates. This
performance di⁄erence is observed only during the crisis period. Foreign MNC subsidiaries
and local counterfactuals showed similar percentage changes of sales in 2005-2007, despite the
former￿ s vertical production linkages. In contrast, MNC subsidiaries with horizontal produc-
tion linkages to their parents fared slightly better than their local matches during non-crisis
years, while the two groups did not di⁄er signi￿cantly in the crisis. But the performance gap
between horizontal subsidiaries and local counterfactuals is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent between
crisis and non-crisis periods. Finally, subsidiaries with neither type of production linkages did
not perform di⁄erently than local matches in both crisis and non-crisis periods.
[Table 2 about here]
In Table 3, we systematically assess the role of vertical production linkages by regressing
MNC subsidiaries￿performance di⁄erence from local matches, i.e., Yi ￿ Yl(i), on the strength
of their input-output relationship with parent ￿rms, i.e., Prod Linkagesi, measured by the
input-cost share of the subsidiary￿ s primary product category in the parent ￿rm￿ s ￿nal-good
production. The results suggest that subsidiaries sharing a stronger vertical production linkage
with their parents tended to exhibit a greater advantage over local counterfactuals during the
crisis. According to column (3), a one-percentage-point increase in the input-output linkage
is associated with 1.06 percentage points higher growth rates. This e⁄ect is found only during
the crisis period, however. In contrast to the crisis period, we do not observe a signi￿cant
relationship between the strength of input-output linkages and MNC subsidiaries￿performance
in non-crisis years. The above result suggests that vertical production linkages lead to greater
resilience to negative economic shocks, but not necessarily superior performance in the absence
of negative shocks. In columns (2) and (4), we control for the e⁄ect of country characteristics
on the relative performance of MNC subsidiaries by limiting the analysis to within-country
16variations.18 The ￿ndings are largely similar.
[Table 3 about here]
The vertical production linkage between foreign owned subsidiaries and parent ￿rms also
determines that the former should exhibit a greater advantage over local competitors when
host countries experience a greater incidence of the crisis, in particular, a larger negative
demand shock. MNC subsidiaries sharing an input-output relationship with their parent ￿rms
tend to engage in more intra-￿rm trade, thereby less dependent on host-country domestic
demand conditions. When the demand in host countries contracts, the intra-￿rm demand
will help absorb part of the shock, leaving the subsidiaries less a⁄ected by the crisis. This
advantage of vertical MNC subsidiaries is particularly important when the demand shocks in
the host countries are relatively large.
The above mechanism conversely implies that the advantage of vertically linked MNC
subsidiaries should be negatively associated with the incidence of the crisis in MNCs￿home
countries. A better demand condition at home will enhance the advantage of vertical sub-
sidiaries abroad, while a worse incidence of the crisis in home markets adversely a⁄ects those
MNC subsidiaries￿performance overseas.
We examine the above hypotheses in Table 4. The incidence of the crisis, in particular,
the degree of the demand shock is proxied here by the average percentage decrease of sales in
each host country and industry. The measure was constructed using either all establishments
in the entire WorldBase dataset or the subset that excludes MNC subsidiaries and their local
matches. The results were similar.19 The estimates obtained with the latter measure are
reported in Table 4.
[Table 4 about here]
We ￿nd that, ￿rst, the e⁄ect of vertical production linkages on MNC subsidiaries￿rel-
ative performance increases in the incidence of the crisis in host countries. Vertical MNC
subsidiaries exhibited a greater advantage over local counterfactuals in countries with larger
negative demand shocks. In contrast, the e⁄ect of vertical production linkages is not signi￿-
cantly associated with the incidence of the crisis in MNCs￿home countries.
18Recall that country-industry speci￿c factors that uniformly a⁄ect the performance of foreign owned and
domestic establishments have been controlled for in the matching analysis by the pairing of foreign owned
subsidiaries and local establishments from the same country and industry. Estimated parameters of country
dummies and intercepts are suppressed in the table because of space consideration.
19We also used countries￿GDP growth rates and import growth rates as alternative proxies and found similar
results.
175.3 The Role of Financial Linkages
Now we consider the role of ￿nancial linkages in explaining MNC subsidiaries￿di⁄erent per-
formance relative to local competitors. Unlike local establishments, MNC subsidiaries have
an additional source of capital supply, i.e., internal capital ￿ ow from parent ￿rms. This in-
ternal capital support from home enables MNC subsidiaries to achieve greater resilience to
host-country ￿nancial shocks than local establishments.
Table 5 reports the estimated e⁄ect of parent-subsidiary ￿nancial linkages, i.e., Financial
Linkagesi, on MNC subsidiaries￿performance di⁄erence from local counterfactuals Yi ￿Yl(i).
We ￿nd that in industries with stronger ￿nancial linkages between parents and subsidiaries,
MNC subsidiaries fared better than their local matches during the crisis. A one-percentage-
point increase in the ratio of investments in subsidiaries is associated with 4.6 percentage
points higher growth rates. This result does not change when we control for the e⁄ect of
vertical production linkages and estimate the full equation (5). Like production linkages, the
e⁄ect of ￿nancial linkages is observed only during the crisis period. The degree of ￿nancial
linkages does not appear to a⁄ect establishment performance during non-crisis years. This
sharp contrast of results suggests that the linkages between foreign subsidiaries and parent
￿rms play an important role in helping MNC subsidiaries better respond to negative economic
shocks, but not necessarily in achieving superior growth in the absence of economic shocks.
[Table 5 about here]
Another way to investigate the role of ￿nancial linkage is to examine whether the e⁄ect
of foreign ownership increases in the level of ￿nancial dependence. In Table 6, we ￿nd a
positive relationship between MNC subsidiaries￿performance di⁄erence from local matches
and industries￿￿nancial dependence level. A one-percentage-point increase in the level of
￿nancial dependence is associated with 0.27 percentage point higher growth rates in 2007-2008.
The relationship between ￿nancial dependence and e⁄ect of foreign ownership is signi￿cantly
weaker in the non-crisis period. A one-percentage-point increase in the level of ￿nancial
dependence is associated with 0.02 percentage point higher growth rates. Again, vertical
production linkages did not play a signi￿cant role in non-crisis years.
[Table 6 about here]
The role of ￿nancial linkages in establishment responses to the crisis is also expected to
increase in the incidence of the crisis in host countries￿￿nancial markets. The internal capital
supply from parent ￿rms overseas should be particularly valuable when the host-country credit
conditions worsen. MNC subsidiaries in industries with stronger intra-￿rm ￿nancial linkages
are thus expected to exhibit a greater advantage over local competitors when host countries
experience greater negative ￿nancial shocks.
18Conversely, the role of intra-￿rm ￿nancial linkages in helping MNC subsidiaries attain
greater resilience should depend on the incidence of the crisis in MNCs￿home-country ￿nancial
markets. A worse credit condition at home will weaken the capital supply from parent ￿rms,
adversely a⁄ecting MNCs￿performance overseas.
Following Rose and Spiegel (2009a), the incidence of the crisis in ￿nancial markets is mea-
sured here by countries￿drop in credit ratings during 2007-2008. Countries that experienced
a bigger drop in credit ratings are considered to have a greater incidence of the crisis in ￿-
nancial markets. As in Rose and Spiegel (2009a), we adopt country credit ratings from the
Institutional Investor magazine, which ranks 177 countries on a scale from 0 to 100 with 100
representing the least likelihood of default (as of March 2009, Switzerland was the most highly
ranked country with a score of 94.0, while Zimbabwe rated at the rear with a score of 4.6).
According to this rating, countries such as New Zealand, Ireland, Greece and Singapore were
among the group with the largest decline in credit conditions while countries such as Brazil,
Peru and Ecuador showed a lesser incidence of the ￿nancial crisis.
[Table 7 about here]
Table 7 reports the results. We ￿nd that the e⁄ect of ￿nancial linkages on establishment re-
silience to the crisis increases in host countries￿incidence of ￿nancial crisis. MNC subsidiaries
exhibited a greater advantage over local competitors in host countries that experienced a
larger decline in credit ratings. In contrast, the positive e⁄ect of ￿nancial linkages is smaller
when MNC home countries experienced large negative ￿nancial shocks. MNC subsidiaries
performed less satisfactorily when their home countries￿credit conditions worsened.
6 Additional Analysis
6.1 Foreign v.s. Domestic Linkages
So far our analysis has emphasized on the e⁄ect of cross-country production and ￿nancial
linkages between foreign owned subsidiaries and their foreign parents. But would the same
e⁄ect exist for the production and ￿nancial linkages between domestically owned subsidiaries
and their domestic parents?
Similar to foreign parent ￿rms, domestic parents can engage in intra-￿rm trade with
subsidiaries and provide the latter internal capital supply. These linkages can help subsidiaries
sustain resilience to local demand and ￿nancial shocks. However, when the shocks occur at
the country level, the e⁄ect of these linkages will be much weaker than the linkages of foreign
owned subsidiaries because the former are located within the same country and exposed to
the same shocks. The linkages between subsidiaries and foreign parents, in contrast, can
provide more stability in this case, because the parent ￿rms are not directly a⁄ected by the
host-country crisis.
19To compare the e⁄ect of foreign and domestic linkages, we expand our ￿nal sample to in-
clude establishments owned by domestic parents. Similar to Section 4, we perform a matching
analysis to match each domestically owned subsidiary with a local stand-alone establishment
from the same country and industry based on economic characteristics. The matched pairs
share similar attributes such as lagged size, lagged labor productivity, age, and previous
exporter status, except the status of domestic parent ownership. We then compare the per-
formance of the matched pairs to establish the e⁄ect of having domestic parents. As in the
analysis of foreign owned subsidiaries, we identify the extent of production and ￿nancial link-
ages between the establishments and their domestic parents and investigate how they a⁄ect
subsidiaries￿performance during the crisis.
Table 8 reports the results. First, we ￿nd in column (1) that compared to domestically
owned subsidiaries, foreign owned subsidiaries exhibited a greater advantage over local coun-
terfactuals. The performance gap between the latter two groups is 18 percentage points higher
than the gap between domestically owned subsidiaries and their local stand-alone matches. In
column (2), we allow the e⁄ect of production and ￿nancial linkages to vary between domestic
and parent ￿rms. The results show that while ￿nancial linkages with domestic parents also
played a stabilizing role during the crisis, the e⁄ect of foreign ￿nancial linkages was signi￿-
cantly greater. Furthermore, only foreign production linkages are found to exert a signi￿cant
and positive e⁄ect on establishments￿resilience to the crisis; domestic production linkages did
not signi￿cantly a⁄ect establishment performance.
[Table 8 about here]
6.2 Network E⁄ect
In addition to production and ￿nancial linkages with foreign parent ￿rms, MNC subsidiaries
exhibit another distinct feature compared to domestic establishments. That is, most multi-
nationals today operate a multilateral network. Having a larger multilateral network enables
multinationals to diversify both product and ￿nancial markets. In this subsection, we take into
account this aspect of multinational ￿rms and examine how a larger multinational network
can potentially amplify the e⁄ect of production and ￿nancial linkages.
To do so, we ￿rst construct two variables to represent the number of countries in the
MNC networks. First, we control for the total number of countries outside the subsidiary
in which MNCs operate. Operation in a larger number of countries implies greater product
market diversi￿cation and potentially greater intra-￿rm demand, lending subsidiaries stronger
resilience to negative host-country demand shocks. Furthermore, a larger network outside the
subsidiary country means that multinationals can o⁄er subsidiaries internal capital ￿ ows from
more sources, mitigating subsidiaries￿vulnerabilities to host-country ￿nancial shocks.
20However, within the aggregate network, the subset that performs identical production
activities as the subsidiary of interest should be considered separately. A larger network of
duplicate production means that multinationals can more easily substitute production across
countries. In a time of negative demand and ￿nancial shocks, multinationals are more likely
to react to the shocks by shifting production to the rest of the network, resulting in greater
volatility. Our second variable hence measures the number of countries in which MNCs
duplicate the subsidiary￿ s production, also referred to as the subsidiary￿ s horizontal network.
Alternative to the simple country counts, we can also take into account the relative size of
the MNC network outside the subsidiary. We compute the share of multinationals￿revenue
received from third and parent countries relative to the share of revenue from the subsidiary
of interest, in either all product categories or just the product category of the subsidiary. A
larger share of total revenue from third and parent countries o⁄ers subsidiaries stronger intra-
￿rm demand and capital supply, enhancing subsidiaries￿resilience to host-country demand
and ￿nancial shocks. But a relatively larger horizontal network that may substitute the
subsidiary￿ s production can lead to footloose behavior and more volatile performance.
Table 9 reports the results. We ￿nd that a greater aggregate network outside the subsidiary
is associated with better subsidiary performance compared to local matches. This result lends
support to the positive role of overall market diversi￿cation in times of economic volatility.
In contrast, the size of the subsidiary￿ s horizontal network did not play a signi￿cant role,
suggesting that the opposing e⁄ects of this type of network lead to an ambiguous net e⁄ect.
Comparing the crisis with non-crisis years, we again ￿nd that, similar to production and
￿nancial linkages, the stabilizing role of networks is pronounced only during the crisis.
[Table 9 about here]
6.3 Unobserved MNC Heterogeneity
The matching technique adopted in the paper helps us identify the e⁄ect of foreign ownership
by limiting the comparison to establishments with similar economic characteristics. There
could, however, remain unobserved heterogeneity across MNCs that is correlated with the
degree of production and ￿nancial linkages.
We take two steps to address this issue. First, we control for potential correlations of
residuals between establishments owned by the same parent ￿rm, as well as between estab-
lishments in the same industry. Cameron, Gelbach and Miller￿ s (2006) multi-way clustering
method is employed for this purpose. As shown in Table 10, the standard errors remain
similar. Both production and ￿nancial linkage measures continue to play a signi￿cant role in
explaining the performance di⁄erence between MNC subsidiaries and their local matches.
[Table 10 about here]
21Second, we control for all ￿rm-level characteristics by including a parent ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ect
and limiting the comparison to establishments owned by the same parent ￿rm. Multinationals
with only one foreign subsidiary are hence dropped from the sample. In doing so, we establish
the role of production linkages by comparing the performance of subsidiaries that belong to
the same multinational but with di⁄erent degrees of input-output linkages. The e⁄ect of
￿nancial linkages cannot be estimated in this speci￿cation because our measure of ￿nancial
linkages does not vary within each parent ￿rm.
[Table 11 about here]
Table 11 reports the results. We continue to ￿nd vertical production linkages to exert a
signi￿cant e⁄ect on MNC subsidiaries￿performance during the crisis. A one-percentage-point
increase in the input-output relationship is associated with 1.28 percentage points higher
growth rates, exceeding the estimated e⁄ect in Table 3. Again, the production linkages do
not appear to systematically a⁄ect establishment performance in non-crisis years.
7 Conclusion
We investigate in this paper the role of foreign ownership in establishment performance during
the recent Global Financial Crisis. Using a worldwide establishment panel dataset, we examine
whether foreign ownership led to di⁄erent resilience to the crisis between establishments with
similar economic attributes and how the role varies from non-crisis periods. Moreover, we
examine how, conditional on foreign ownership, production and ￿nancial linkages explain the
di⁄erential responses of MNC subsidiaries.
We ￿nd that MNC subsidiaries responded on average better to the recent crisis than
local controls with similar economic characteristics. The advantage of foreign ownership was
clearly pronounced during the crisis, while relatively muted in non-crisis years. Production
and ￿nancial linkages played critical roles in explaining the di⁄erential responses of MNC
subsidiaries. Establishments sharing stronger vertical production linkages with foreign parent
￿rms exhibited more resilient performance during the crisis, especially in host countries with
a greater incidence of the crisis. Horizontally linked establishments, in contrast, performed no
better than the control establishments. The same pattern is not observed in non-crisis years.
Vertical MNC subsidiaries did not perform di⁄erently than their local matches in the non-
crisis period, while horizontal subsidiaries fared slightly better. Financial linkages similarly
played an important role during the crisis. MNC subsidiaries operating in industries with
greater intra-￿rm ￿nancial linkages exhibited a greater advantage over local counterfactuals.
Similar to production linkages, the role of ￿nancial linkages was signi￿cant only during the
crisis period, especially in host countries with signi￿cantly worsened credit conditions.
22Our results identify important bene￿ts associated with the linkages created by foreign
ownership. While multinationals￿footloose behavior might lead to greater volatility, vertical
production and ￿nancial linkages between MNC subsidiaries and parent ￿rms could potentially
alleviate the impact of the crisis in host countries. These ￿ndings are central to academic
and policy debates centered on the role of foreign direct investment in economic growth and
volatility, and have critical implications for policy making that in￿ uence the ￿ ow of foreign
investments.
A promising avenue of future research comprises, for example, analysis on the role of multi-
national linkages in cross-country economic interdependence, in particular, how the linkages
may serve as international transmission mechanisms in a time of economic crises. Our results
show that the performance of MNC subsidiaries is conditional on the incidence of the ￿nan-
cial crisis in parent countries. Further research on how multinationals￿intra-￿rm production
and ￿nancial linkages could transmit shocks from parent to host countries and vice versa and
between di⁄erent host nations could o⁄er useful academic and policy insights.
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26Table 1: Estimated Average E⁄ect of Foreign Ownership
(1) (2) (3)
Crisis Non-crisis Di⁄.
Performance di⁄erence b/w 0.03*** 0.002* 0.028**
MNC subsidiaries and local matches (0.01) (0.001) (0.01)
Number of matched pairs 43,513 43,513 43,513
Notes: This table reports MNC subsidiaries￿average performance di⁄erence from their local
matches in crisis and non-crisis periods. Performance is measured by the annual percentage
change in sales. Propensity score matching is employed to identify the matches of MNC
subsidiaries. Standard errors are bootstrapped with industry clustering and reported in the
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.




Performance di⁄erence: Horizontal 0.02 0.002** 0.018
(0.013) (0.001) (0.01)
Performance di⁄erence: Vertical 0.23** -0.001 0.23**
(0.10) (0.01) (0.10)
Performance di⁄erence: Neither 0.03 0.003 0.027
(0.04) (0.002) (0.02)
Notes: This table reports MNC subsidiaries￿average performance di⁄erence from their local
matches, by type of production linkages, in crisis and non-crisis periods. Performance is
measured by the annual percentage change in sales. Propensity score matching is employed
to identify the matches of MNC subsidiaries. Standard errors are bootstrapped with industry
clustering and reported in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
27Table 3: Foreign Ownership and Establishment Performance: Production Linkages
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Performance di⁄erence Crisis Crisis Non-crisis Non-crisis
Production linkages 1.06* 0.96** -0.04 -0.03
(0.62) (0.46) (0.05) (0.05)
Country FE No Yes No Yes
Number of matched pairs 43,513 43,513 43,513 43,513
R square 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00
Notes: This table examines the e⁄ect of production linkages on MNC subsidiaries￿perfor-
mance di⁄erence from their local matches during crisis and non-crisis periods. Performance
is measured by the annual percentage change in sales. Standard errors are bootstrapped with
industry clustering and reported in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4: Foreign Ownership and Establishment Performance: Production Linkages and
Demand Shocks
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3)
Performance di⁄erence Crisis Crisis Crisis
Production linkages 1.81** 1.20* 2.14**
(0.93) (0.70) (1.07)
x Host-country demand shocks 4.26* 4.45*
(2.60) (2.68)
x Home-country demand shocks 1.32 1.64
(2.07) (1.47)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Number of matched pairs 43,513 43,513 43,513
R square 0.05 0.05 0.05
Notes: This table examines the e⁄ect of production linkages and country demand shocks on
MNC subsidiaries￿performance di⁄erence from their local matches during the crisis. Perfor-
mance is measured by the annual percentage change in sales. Standard errors are bootstrapped
with industry clustering and reported in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
28Table 5: Foreign Ownership and Establishment Performance: Financial Linkages
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Performance di⁄erence Crisis Crisis Non-crisis Non-crisis
Financial linkages 4.67** 4.62** 0.06 0.06
(2.26) (2.25) (0.24) (0.24)
Production linkages 0.95** -0.03
(0.51) (0.05)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of matched pairs 43,513 43,513 43,513 43,513
R square 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02
Notes: This table examines the e⁄ect of ￿nancial linkages on MNC subsidiaries￿performance
di⁄erence from their local matches during crisis and non-crisis periods. Performance is mea-
sured by the annual percentage change in sales. Standard errors are bootstrapped with
industry clustering and reported in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 6: Foreign Ownership and Establishment Performance: Financial Dependence
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Performance di⁄erence Crisis Crisis Non-crisis Non-crisis
Financial dependence 0.27* 0.27* 0.02** 0.02**
(0.17) (0.17) (0.01) (0.01)
Production linkages 0.86** -0.04
(0.43) (0.05)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of matched pairs 43,513 43,513 43,513 43,513
R square 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02
Notes: This table examines the e⁄ect of ￿nancial dependence on MNC subsidiaries￿perfor-
mance di⁄erence from their local matches during crisis and non-crisis periods. Performance
is measured by the annual percentage change in sales. Standard errors are bootstrapped with
industry clustering and reported in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
29Table 7: Foreign Ownership and Establishment Performance: Financial Linkages and
Financial Shocks
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3)
Performance di⁄erence Crisis Crisis Crisis
Financial linkages 3.28* 5.64*** 4.17**
(1.83) (1.86) (1.95)
x Host-country ￿nancial shocks 4.06** 4.64***
(1.86) (1.91)
x Home-country ￿nancial shocks -1.51* -1.54*
(0.91) (0.91)
Production linkages 1.82** 1.19** 2.14**
(0.86) (0.61) (1.13)
x Host-country demand shocks 4.32** 4.47*
(2.17) (2.32)
x Home-country demand shocks 0.97 1.23
(3.95) (3.95)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Number of matched pairs 43,513 43,513 43,513
R square 0.05 0.05 0.05
Notes: This table examines the e⁄ect of ￿nancial linkages and country ￿nancial shocks on
MNC subsidiaries￿performance di⁄erence from their local matches during the crisis. Perfor-
mance is measured by the annual percentage change in sales. Standard errors are bootstrapped
with industry clustering and reported in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
30Table 8: Comparison of Foreign and Domestic Production and Financial Linkages
Dependent variable: (1) (2)
Performance di⁄erence Crisis Crisis
Foreign ownership 0.18*** 0.05**
(0.01) (0.02)
x Financial linkages 0.85*
(0.50)






Country FE Yes Yes
Number of matched pairs 269,008 269,008
R square 0.04 0.05
Notes: This table examines the di⁄erential e⁄ect of foreign and domestic linkages on sub-
sidiaries￿performance di⁄erence from their local matches. Both foreign and domestically
owned subsidiaries are included in the sample. Performance is measured by the annual per-
centage change in sales. Propensity score matching is employed to identify the matches of
foreign and domestically owned subsidiaries. Standard errors are bootstrapped with industry
clustering and reported in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
31Table 9: The E⁄ect of MNC Networks
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Performance di⁄erence Crisis Crisis Non-crisis Non-crisis
Financial linkages 4.83*** 4.97*** 0.06 0.06
(1.76) (1.78) (0.13) (0.19)
Production linkages 0.93** 0.91** -0.03 -0.03
(0.59) (0.40) (0.04) (0.05)
Network (country count) 0.003** 0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
Horizontal network (country count) 0.002 -0.0001
(0.004) (0.000)
Network (revenue share) 0.06* 0.0002
(0.03) (0.002)
Horizontal network (revenue share) 0.01 0.001
(0.04) (0.003)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of matched pairs 43,513 43,513 43,513 43,513
R square 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02
Notes: This table examines the e⁄ect of MNC networks on MNC subsidiaries￿performance
di⁄erence from their local matches. Performance is measured by the annual percentage change
in sales. Standard errors are bootstrapped with industry clustering and reported in the
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 10: Foreign Ownership and Establishment Performance: Controlling for Correla-
tions of Residuals within MNCs and within industries
Dependent variable: (1) (2)
Performance di⁄erence Crisis Non-crisis
Financial linkages 4.62** 0.06
(2.30) (0.25)
Production linkages 0.95** -0.03
(0.52) (0.05)
Country FE Yes Yes
MNC and industry clusters Yes Yes
Number of matched pairs 43,513 43,513
R square 0.05 0.02
Notes: This table controls for correlations of residuals between establishments owned by the
same MNC and between establishments in the same industry. Cameron, Gelbach and Miller￿ s
(2006)￿ s multi-way clustering is employed. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
32Table 11: Foreign Ownership and Establishment Performance: Controlling for MNC
￿rm heterogeneity
Dependent variable: (1) (2)
Performance di⁄erence Crisis Non-crisis
Financial linkages ￿ ￿
Production linkages 1.28* -0.15
(0.74) (0.09)
MNC ￿rm FE Yes Yes
Number of matched pairs 32,363 32,363
R square 0.18 0.15
Notes: This table controls for MNC ￿rm heterogeneity in examining the e⁄ect of production
and ￿nancial linkages on MNC subsidiaries￿performance di⁄erence from their local matches.
Performance is measured by the annual percentage change in sales. Standard errors are boot-
strapped with industry clustering and reported in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
Table A.1: Comparison of MNC subsidiaries and local matches in lagged economic characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Economic characteristics ln(Sales) ln(Labor ln(Age) Exporter Multi-
(lagged) productivity) status product
Di⁄erence b/w MNC subsidiaries 0.01 0.01 0.006 0.005 0.003
and local matches (0.01) (0.01) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Number of matched pairs 43,513 43,513 43,513 43,513 43,513
Notes: This table reports the sample mean di⁄erences between MNC subsidiaries and local
matches in lagged economic characteristics. Propensity score matching is employed to identify
the matches of MNC subsidiaries.
33